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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Utah State Tax Commission ("Commission") 
properly determine that Bonneville International Corporation's 
("Bonneville") business activities did not fall within the range 
of business activities defined by the Utah Legislature as 
entitled to the sales tax exemption contained in Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-104(16)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Commission found that Bonneville's business did not 
fall within the explicitly stated range of activities entitled to 
a sales tax exemption on purchases of certain equipment under 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16). While not appearing in the 
"Findings of Fact" section of the Commission's Final Decision, 
this determination constitutes a finding of fact made by the 
Commission. 
When reviewing a finding of fact, this Court 
shall grant relief only if, on the basis of 
the agency1 s record, it determines that the 
person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
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(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989). "In accordance with the 
mandate just quoted, this court grants great deference to an 
agency's findings, and will uphold them if they are 'supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court.'" Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 
448 (Utah App. 1991) . 
The Commission's administration of specific and 
unambiguous language of an exemption statute is reviewed for 
reasonableness. The Commission abuses its discretion when its 
action - viewed in the context of the language and purpose of the 
statute - is unreasonable. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h) (i ); 
Morton Int'l v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) (1987): 
The following sales and uses are exempt 
from the taxes imposed by this chapter: 
• • • 
(16) Sales or leases of machinery and 
equipment purchases or leased by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expanding 
operations (excluding normal operating 
replacements, which includes replacement 
machinery and equipment even though they may 
increase plant production or capacity, as 
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determined by the commission) in any 
manufacturing facility in Utah. 
Manufacturing facility means an establishment 
described in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the 
Standard Industrial Classification Manual 
1972, of the federal Executive Office of the 
President, Office of Management and Budget. 
For the purposes of this subsection, the 
commission shall by rule define "new or 
expanding operations" and "establishment"; 
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget, Standard Industrial Classification Manual, 1972. 
Classification 3652, Phonograph Records and Pre-recorded 
Magnetic Tape: 
Establishments primarily engaged in 
manufacturing phonograph records and pre-
recorded magnetic tape. Establishments 
primarily engaged in manufacturing electronic 
equipment for home entertainment, except 
records and pre-recorded magnetic tape, are 
classified in Industry 3651. 
Classification 7819, Services Allied to Motion Picture 
Production: 
Establishments primarily engaged in 
performing services independent of motion 
picture production but allied thereto, such * 
as motion picture film processing, editing 
and titling; casting bureaus; wardrobe and 
studio property rental; television tape 
services (editing, transfers, etc.); and 
stock footage film libraries. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 13, 1990, Bonneville requested an advisory 
opinion from the Commission concerning the availability of a 
sales tax exemption on certain equipment purchased by two 
-3-
Bonneville divisions, Bonneville Communications and Video West. 
(R. 96-97.) The Commission decided that none of the purchases 
qualified for the exemption. (R. 94-95.) 
On January 24, 1991, Bonneville filed a Petition for 
Redetermination. In answer to that Petition, the Commission 
conceded that Bonneville qualified for an exemption for the 
reproduction of audio tapes. (R. 14-17.) On February 4, 1992, a 
formal hearing was held. Following the formal hearing, 
Bonneville and the Commission agreed that the Petition for 
Redetermination would be treated as a claim for refund of sales 
tax paid. (R. 12-13.) On September 2, 1992, the Commission 
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final 
Decision ("Final Decision") affirming its previous opinion and 
denying the sales tax exemption to Bonneville on its video taping 
equipment. (R. 5-10.) (See Addendum "A"). Bonneville has 
petitioned this Court for review of the Commission's Final 
Decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Bonneville is a Utah corporation engaged principally in 
radio and television broadcasting. One of Bonneville's 
divisions, Video West, purchased certain video taping equipment 
for which it sought an exemption from sales tax from the 
Commission. "Video West engages in the assembly, duplication and 
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distribution of video tapes." (R. 67.) The Commission denied 
the exemption based on its finding that Bonneville's business 
activity did not fall within the scope of business activities 
which qualify for the exemption as specified by the Utah 
Legislature. (R. 7-10.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission has properly carried out its duty cf 
administering the tax code. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-118 (1987) 
states that "[t]he administration of this chapter is vested in 
and shall be exercised by the commission which may prescribe 
forms and rules to conform with this chapter for the . . . 
assessment, and collection of the taxes imposed under this 
chapter." In connection with its duty to administer the tax 
code, the Commission has followed the explicit guidance of the 
Utah Supreme Court to construe sales tax exemption statutes 
strictly. "Statutes which provide for exemptions should be 
strictly construed, and one who so claims has the burden of 
showing his entitlement to the exemption." Parsons Asphalt 
Products v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 1980). 
Bonneville has failed to meet its burden of showing that it is 
entitled to a sales tax exemption in this case. 
The Utah Legislature's definition of "manufacturing 
facility" is unambiguous. The Utah Supreme Court's mandate to 
-5-
construe exemption statutes strictly is equally unambiguous. 
Bonneville suggests that "the Commission should recognize that 
the Legislature's reference to Codes 2000 through 3999 was 
intended as a shorthand way of saying that any establishment 
involved in a 'manufacturing' activity qualifies for the 
exemption." Brief of Petitioner at 8 (emphasis in original). 
First, this suggestion ignores the clear language of the 
exemption statute (Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16), and second, it 
ignores the clear language of the Utah Supreme Court in Parsons. 
Accordingly, this Court should not adopt the broad reading of the 
exemption statute urged by Bonneville. 
The Utah Legislature was explicit in defining certain 
"manufacturing" business activities which are entitled to a sales 
tax exemption under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) when it 
defined "[m]anufacturing facility [as] an establishment described 
in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the Standard Industrial 
Classification Manual 1972 • . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(16). Therefore, the Commission's finding that Bonneville 
does not fall within the clear definition of "manufacturing 
facility" does not constitute a legal interpretation of the 
statute and should be reviewed as a finding of fact made by the 
Commission. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. EXEMPTIONS FROM SALES TAX GRANTED BY THE 
LEGISLATURE ARE TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY 
AND BONNEVILLE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS 
BURDEN OF SHOWING ITS ENTITLEMENT TO THE 
EXEMPTION. 
It is a well-settled principle of taxation that "[e]ven 
though taxing statues should generally be construed favorable to 
the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority, the 
reverse is true of exemptions." Parsons Asphalt Products v. Utah 
State Tax Comm' n, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 1980). "Statutes which 
provide for exemptions should be strictly construed, and one who 
so claims has the burden of showing his entitlement to the 
exemption." JEd. at 398. "This narrow construction of the 
statutory language also follows the general rule that tax 
statutes are to be strictly construed against one seeking 
exemption." Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 
1297 (Utah 1992) (footnote omitted). See also, Morton Int'l v. 
Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581, 592 n. 60 (Utah 1991); Great 
Salt Lake Minerals v. State Tax Comm'n, 573 P.2d 337, 340 (Utah 
1977) ("Exemptions from taxation are to be strictly construed and 
all ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of taxation."). 
Bonneville claims that it is entitled to an exemption 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16). In support of its claim, 
Bonneville argues that "the Commission should recognize that the 
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Legislature's reference to Codes 2000 through 3999 was intended 
as a shorthand way of saying that any establishment involved in a 
'manufacturing' activity qualifies for the exemption." Brief of 
Petitioner at 8 (emphasis in original). In doing so, Bonneville 
advocates a position contrary to the well-settled principles of 
taxation laid down by the Utah Supreme Court. Bonneville's 
advocacy of a "shorthand" definition of who is entitled to a 
sales tax exemption ignores long standing law regarding 
exemptions. 
Bonneville has failed to meet its burden in showing 
that it is entitled to an exemption in this case. Bonneville has 
failed to establish that its video tape operations engage 
principally in manufacturing pre-recorded magnetic tape. In 
fact, Bonneville has admitted that its processes are concerned 
with video tape duplication rather than tape manufacturing. (R. 
60. ) 
Bonneville has argued that its video taping activities 
properly fall within those activities described by SIC Code 3652 
which reads: 
Establishments primarily engaged in 
manufacturing phonograph records and pre-
recorded magnetic tape. Establishments 
primarily engaged in manufacturing electronic 
equipment for home entertainment, except 
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records and pre-recorded magnetic tapef are 
classified in Industry 3651. 
See Addendum "B". 
The Commission, after considering evidence given at the 
formal hearing, as well as Bonneville's hearing memoranda, 
concluded that video duplication activities did not fall within 
the scope of SIC Code 3652. The Commission concluded that, based 
on the evidence, B.onneville' s video duplication activities 
properly fall within the scope of activities described by SIC 
Code 7819 which reads: 
Establishments primarily engaged in 
performing services independent of motion 
picture production but allied thereto, such 
as motion picture film processing, editing 
and titling; casting bureaus; wardrobe and 
studio property rental; television tape 
services (editing, transfers, etc.); and 
stock footage film libraries. 
(R. 9.) See Addendum "B". 
In reaching its conclusion, the Commission referred to 
the more recent 1987 version of the SIC Code. The Commission 
found that the 1987 version "specifically limits activity code 
3652 to audio media." (R. 8.) While Bonneville contends that 
the Commission's reference to the 1987 Code was improper (Brief 
of Petitioner at 20-21), the Commission merely uses the 1987 
version as support for the fact that there is a distinction 
between audio and video duplication activities. The 1987 SIC 
-9-
Code makes exactly the distinction which Bonneville claims is 
"curious." Brief of Petitioner at 7. That is, a distinction 
between audio duplication activities specifically referred to in 
classification 3652 and video taping activities. The 1987 
version of the SIC Manual specifically excludes video duplication 
activities from classification 3652. In the 1987 edition, 
classification 3652 includes "[establishments primarily engaged 
in manufacturing phonograph records and prerecorded audio tapes 
and disks." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, by specific mention 
to audio tapes in the 1987 version, a distinction is clearly 
drawn between audio and video tapes. The Commission's reference 
to the 1987 SIC Manual aids in determining the important 
distinction between audio taping activities and video taping 
activities for the purpose of classification of business 
activities. 
Bonneville argues for a very broad interpretation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) by including all manufacturing 
activities. This interpretation totally disregards the 
Legislature's clear definition which limits the scope of the 
exemption. Bonneville further argues for broad application of 
the terms of classification 3652 of the SIC Manual. Such broad 
interpretations are contrary to the clear mandate set forth by 
the Utah Supreme Court to construe exemption statutes strictly. 
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This Court should recognize that the "Commission has no authority 
to extend the exemption beyond the scope of the legislative 
determination" (R. 9.) and uphold the Commission's Final 
Decision. 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE BROAD 
INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-
12-104(16) URGED BY BONNEVILLE. 
The Commission has expressly been given authority by 
the Utah Legislature to administer the tax laws of the state. 
Utah Code Ann- § 59-12-118 states that M[t]he administration of 
this chapter is vested in and shall be exercised by the 
commission which may prescribe forms and rules to conform with 
this chapter . . . for the ascertainment, assessment, and 
collection of the taxes imposed under this chapter." In 
connection with carrying out these administrative duties, the 
Commission has been called upon in this case to determine whether 
Bonneville's business activities properly fall within the 
definition of "manufacturing facility" set forth by the 
Legislature and adopted by the Commission. Utah Code Admin. P. 
R865-19-85S(A)(4). In properly carrying out its duty to 
administer the taxing chapter of the Utah Code, the Commission 
must stay within the strict guidelines set forth by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Therefore, the Commission has given the exemption 
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granted by the Legislature a strict reading and rejected 
Bonneville's "shorthand" approach. 
Bonneville suggests that the Commission use a different 
"methodology" for determining whether certain activities are 
"manufacturing" under the SIC Code. "When the taxpayer is clearly 
engaged in an activity that is properly described as 
'manufacturing' within the definition used at the beginning of 
Division D [of the SIC Code], the Commission should conclude that 
the taxpayer's establishment is a 'manufacturing facility' within 
the meaning of Section 59-12-104(16)•" Brief of Petitioner at 
18. What this suggestion fails to recognize is that "by its own 
terms, the 1972 SIC manual is intended to cover the entire field 
of economic activities." (R. 9.) Therefore, if a 
"manufacturing" activity is not included in the "manufacturing" 
classifications of the SIC Code, then, by the definitions of SIC 
Code itself, the activity is not "manufacturing." And, 
regardless of the results of the "initial determination" exercise 
suggested by Bonneville, the activity does not fit the definition 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16). Further, if the 
Commission were to take Bonneville's suggestion and adopt its 
proffered methodology, the definition of "manufacturing facility" 
set forth by the Utah Legislature would become meaningless. 
"Once that determination is made [that an activity is 
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'manufacturing'], the question of which SIC Code within Division 
D applies is less important." Brief of Petitioner at 18 
(emphasis in original). Not only does it become "less important" 
but it would be irrelevant. If one can decide whether a business 
activity is "manufacturing" without reference to the SIC Code, as 
Bonneville suggests, then the Utah Legislature's explicit 
definition is lost by adoption of a standardless determination of 
"manufacturing." Using this broad "standard" urged by Bonneville 
to define certain business activities would be contrary to the 
Legislature's explicit definition in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(16) . 
The Commission has properly construed the definition of 
"manufacturing facility" contained in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
104(16). And, according to explicit Utah Supreme Court mandate, 
has construed it strictly against Bonneville because it is an 
exemption statute. In so doing, the Commission has carried out 
its duty to administer the tax chapter of the Utah Code as 
directed by the Legislature. The Commission is bound by the 
clear language of both the Legislature and the Utah Supreme 
Court. Therefore, the Commission is powerless to expand the 
definition of business activities so as to grant Bonneville a 
sales tax exemption for this activity. If Bonneville wishes to 
expand that definition, the proper avenue is through the 
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Legislature, not the Commission. Therefore, this Court should 
not adopt the broad reading of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) and 
affirm the Commission's decision. 
II. THE DEFINITION OF - MANUFACTURING 
FACILITY" IN UTAH CODE ANN S 59-12-
104(16) IS UNAMBIGUOUS AND REQUIRED NO 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION BY THE COMMISSION 
WHICH WOULD MANDATE REVIEW UNDER THE 
"ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION" STANDARD. 
The definition of "manufacturing facility" contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) is unambiguous. The language used 
by the Legislature is clear. Contrary to Bonneville's 
suggestions, the language chosen by the Legislature does not 
operate as merely a "shorthand" way to clarify the legislature's 
intent. The definition does exactly what the Legislature said it 
does; that is, defines manufacturing facility." "The terms of a 
statute should be interpreted in accord with usually accepted 
meanings. In construing legislative enactments, the reviewer 
assumes that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus 
the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." Savage Industries v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991) (footnotes omitted). 
See also, Chris & Dicks Lumber v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 
1990); Hector, Inc. v. United Savings and Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 
542 (Utah 1987). 
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Bonneville repeatedly speculates as to what the 
"intent" of the Utah Legislature might have been in defining 
"manufacturing facility" by the terms it did. "The exemption, of 
course, is clearly intended to encourage investment in new 
manufacturing facilities in Utah." Brief of Petitioner at 10. 
"The purpose for creating this exemption for purchases of new 
equipment used for manufacturing in Utah is diamond clear. The 
Legislature obviously sought to create incentives . . . toward 
investment . . . ." Brief of Petitioner at 15. "The 
Legislature's obvious intent when it defined 'manufacturing 
facility' by reference to Codes 2000 to 3999 was to insure that 
all establishments engaged in activities properly described as 
'manufacturing' would be eligible for the exemption." Brief of 
Petitioner at 17 (emphasis in original). This speculation by 
Bonneville as to legislative intent is not warranted by the clear 
language of the definition of "manufacturing facility." 
The Commission has merely stayed within the confines of 
the language of the definition in finding that Bonneville's 
business activities do not fall within scope of the exemption. 
Such a finding required no interpretation of the statute, it 
merely required the Commission to examine the record, consider 
Bonneville's arguments, and decide whether Bonneville's business 
activities fall within the legislatively created definition. The 
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Commission did exactly that and concluded that Bonneville's 
business activities did not fall within the scope of the 
definition. The question was purely factual. "[T]he 
determination of the proper SIC activity code for [Bonneville] is 
determinative of this appeal." (R. 8.) Such a determination 
required no statutory interpretation for which legislative intent 
must be found. 
Bonneville claims that the "Commission agrees [that 
Bonneville's business activities are] clearly 'manufacturing' . . 
. ." Brief of Petitioner at 15. And, although the Commission 
refers to Bonneville as a "manufacturer" at one point in the 
Final Decision, that fact is irrelevant. It is irrelevant 
because regardless of how the Commission refers to Bonneville's 
activities, if those activities do not fall within the definition 
mandated by the Legislature, the Commission is bound to adhere 
strictly to that definition. The Utah Legislature has stated a 
clear definition of the business activities to which it intended 
to grant a sales tax exemption. The Commission is bound by that 
definition as well as Bonneville. The Commission concluded that 
Bonneville's business activities did not fall within the 
Legislature's definition of those activities which are entitled 
to a sales tax exemption. This decision is a finding of fact, 
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supported by substantial evidence, and should be reviewed by this 
Court accordingly. 
A. THE COMMISSION'S FINDING IS NOT 
"UNREASONABLE" OR AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
As discussed above, the Commission has been given 
express authority from the Utah Legislature to administer the tax 
laws of the State. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-116. This Court has 
placed some limitations on the Commission's grant of power to 
interpret, as opposed to administer, taxing statutes. Belnorth 
Petroleum Corporation v. State Tax Comm'n, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 
32 n. 5 (Utah App. 1993). However, the Commission has engaged in 
absolutely no statutory interpretation exercise in this case. 
In attempting to argue that the Commission's decision 
was unreasonable, Bonneville engages in the same strained 
"methodology" that it urges the Commission to adopt. First, 
Bonneville speculates as to the Legislature's intent in allowing 
the § 59-12-104(16) exemption. "[T]he Legislature undoubtedly 
enacted the sales tax exemption in Section 59-12-104(15) for the 
purpose of encouraging investment in manufacturing facilities in 
Utah." Brief of Petitioner at 26. Then, in conclusory fashion, 
Bonneville states that the "Commission's interpretation of 
Section 59-12-104(15) in this case runs directly contrary to the 
purpose of that exemption." Brief of Petitioner at 26. First, 
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Bonneville's speculation of legislative intent in this case is 
unwarranted and not needed; the language of the exemption statute 
is clear. Regardless of what Bonneville claims was the 
legislative intent in granting the exemption, the Commission has 
been granted authority to make tax policy determinations when 
legislative intent is unclear. "The agency that has been granted 
authority to administer the statute is the appropriate body to 
make such a determination." Morton Int'l v. Auditing Division, 
814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991). Second, Bonneville's conclusion 
that the Commission's decision is an abuse of discretion is 
unfounded given the clear language of the exemption statute, the 
Commission's duty to properly administer the tax code, and the 
well-settled principle that exemption statutes are to be 
construed strictly against the taxpayer. The Commission has 
properly carried out its duty to properly administer the tax laws 
of this state. Therefore, this Court should uphold the 
Commission's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The broad reading of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) 
which Bonneville urges is contrary to the well established law in 
Utah that tax exemption statutes should be construed strictly 
against the taxpayer. The Commission has not adopted such a 
broad reading and neither should this Court. 
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The Commission made its final decision after the 
parties briefed the issues and participated in a formal hearing 
which fully established the relevant facts of the case. The 
Commission's findings should be granted deference by this Court 
and upheld if it finds that the findings are supported by 
substantial evidence. Given the clear mandate given by the Utah 
Supreme Court to read exemptions strictly against the taxpayer, 
the evidence is substantial enough to uphold the Commission's 
decision not to allow the exemption. Therefore, this Court 
should uphold the Commission's decision.^ j 
is 0 RESPECTFULLY submitted th O day of March, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
^ J(A 
BRIAN L. TARBET 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
BONNEVILLE INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on February 4, 1992. Alan Hennebold, 
Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the 
Commission. Boyd J. Hawkins, Assistant General Counsel for 
Bonneville International Corporation, represented the 
Petitioner. Brian Tarbet, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 
represented the Respondent. 
Prior to the hearing, the parties submitted a 
Stipulation of Facts. Based upon the stipulated facts and 
evidence presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby 
makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner is primarily engaged in radio and 
television broadcasting, but also does business in related 
fields through various operating divisions. On December 3, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 91-0257 
Account No. 96774 
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1990, the Commission issued an advisory opinion holding that 
purchases or leases of manufacturing machinery and equipment by 
two of Petitioner's operating divisions, Video West and 
Bonneville Communications, are not exempt from sales • and use 
tax pursuant to U.C.A. 559-12-104(15) [formerly 
§59-12-104(16)]- Petitioner then sought review of the 
Commission's advisory opinion by filing its Petition For 
Redetermination. The parties have subsequently agreed that 
Petitioner's Petition for Redetermination may be treated by the 
Commission as a claim for refund of sales tax already paid by 
Petitioner. 
2. Video West assembles, duplicates and distributes 
video tapes from its own facility. It is a separate cost 
center with separate financial statements. In 1990, video tape 
manufacturing accounted for 45% of Video West's net sales, with 
the remainder derived from production of commercials, training 
tapes, and the like. 
3. Bonneville Communications, another of 
Bonneville's operating divisions, is nearly identical to Video 
West except that it manufactures audio tapes instead of video 
tapes. The parties have stipulated that purchases or leases of 
manufacturing equipment by Bonneville Communications are exempt 
from sales and use tax pursuant to U.C.A. §59-12-104(15). In a 
separate Order, the Commission has approved the parties' 
stipulation with respect to Bonneville Communications. 
4. The magnetic tape used by Bonneville 
Communications and Video West in their respective operations is 
essentially the same material. 
2 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Machinery and equipment purchased or leased by a 
manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding 
normal operating replacements) in any manufacturing facility in 
Utah are exempt from sales and use tax. [U.C.A. 
§59-12-104(15).] 
"Manufacturing facility" means an establishment 
described in SIC Code Classification 2000-3999 of the Standard 
Industrial Classification Manual 1972, of the Federal Executive 
Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget. 
[U.C.A. §59-12-104(15).] 
"Manufacturer" means a person who: 
a. Functions within the activities included in SIC 
Code Classification 2000-3999; 
b. Produces a new, reconditioned, or remanufactured 
product, article, substance, or commodity from raw, 
semi-finished, or used material; and 
c. In the normal course of business, produces 
products for sale as tangible personal property. [Utah State 
Tax Commission Administrative Rule R865-19-85S(14).] 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The Commission has accepted the parties' stipulation 
that purchases or leases of equipment used by Bonneville 
Communications in the manufacture of audio tapes are exempt 
from sales and use tax pursuant to U.C.A. §59-12-104(15). The 
issue now before the Commission is whether Video West is also 
entitled to the same exemption. Respondent concedes that Video 
West meets all criteria for exemption except the requirement 
J0000007 
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that it function within activity codes 2000-3999 as set forth 
in the 1972 SIC manual. Therefore, the determination of the 
proper SIC activity code for Video West is determinative of 
this appeal. 
Petitioner argues that video tape manufacture is 
included in activity code 3652, which is titled "Phonograph 
Records and Pre-recorded Magnetic Tape" and includes 
"establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing phonograph 
records and prerecorded magnetic tape". However, the 
Commission considers it unlikely that the drafters of the 1972 
SIC manual intended to include video tape reproduction in the 
same activity code as activities related to audio media such as 
phonograph records. The Commission's interpretation of the 
scope of activity code 3652 is supported by the fact that the 
1987 SIC manual specifically limits activity code 3652 to audio 
media. 
For its part, Respondent contends that video tape 
manufacture is included in the 1972 SIC manual's activity code 
7814, "Motion Picture and Tape Production For Television": 
Establishments primarily engaged in the 
production of theatrical and nontheatrical motion 
pictures and tape, including commercials, for 
television exhibition. Establishments engaged in 
both production and distribution are included 
here. . . . 
However, the notes following activity code 7814 specifically 
exclude video tape reproduction. The Commission therefore 
concludes that video tape reproduction is not encompassed by 
the 1972 manual's activity code 7814. 
4 
By its own terms, the 1972 SIC manual is intended to 
cover the entire field of economic activities. If Video West's 
video tape reproduction activities are not included in the 
manual's activity code 3652 as urged by Petitioner, or in 
activity code 7814 as urged by Respondent, it must be included 
in another of the manual's activity codes. The Commission 
finds that video tape reproduction is included in the manual's 
activity code 7819—Services Allied to Motion Picture 
Production: 
Establishments primarily engaged in performing 
services independent of motion picture production 
but allied thereto, such as motion picture film 
processing, editing and titling; casting bureaus; 
wardrobe and studio property rental; television 
tape services (editing, transfers, etc.); and 
stock footage film libraries. 
The foregoing list of activities allied to motion 
picture production is not exclusive and is broad enough to 
encompass video tape reproduction. The 1987 SIC Manual 
specifically places "motion picture and video tape 
reproduction" in activity code 7819. 
The Commission's obligation in this matter is to 
determine whether Video West's activities fall with the SIC 
activity codes designated by the legislature as qualifying for 
exemption from sales tax. The Commission has no authority to 
extend the exemption beyond the scope of the legislative 
determination. After reviewing the various SIC activity codes 
and comments, the Commission concludes that Video West's 
reproduction of video tapes is included in activity 7819 of the 
1972 SIC manual. Because Video West's activities fall outside 
5 
.'0000009 
those SIC classifications which are exempt from sales and use 
tax under U.C.A. §59-12-104(15), the Commission concludes 
Petitioner is liable for payment of sales and use tax with 
respect to machinery and equipment purchased or leased by Video 
West for the reproduction of video tapes. The Commission 
therefore reaffirms its previous declaratory order as it 
pertains to Video West and denies Video West's request for 
refund of sales tax already paid. It is so ordered. 
DATED this . /^H day of ^iZlrY^^. 1991. 
BY QRBER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
/WUut/A/tt. 
S. Blaine Willes 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirtj^CSTfcKdays 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme'.?^S»r^v a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. SS63^4^HJw%, 
63-46b-14(2)(a). r? . \ \\ 
AH/sj/3143w ; >• ' |J, 
• < ^ 
-\: v 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy, of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Bonneville International Corp. 
c/o Roland Radack 
KSL Video West, Bonneville 
KSL Broadcast House 5 Triad Center 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Boyd J. Hawkins 
Assistant General Counsel 
Bonneville International Corp. 
55 North Third West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1160 
Craig Sandberg 
Assistant Director, Auditing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
James H. Rogers 
Director, Auditing Div. 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Brian Tarbet 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this ^ day of ^£/3{iff?/*'-1 , 1992, 
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ADDENDUM "B 
190 STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 
GroQp Industry 
No. Ho. 
IN 
SMS 
S6S 
S6S1 
ELECTRIC LIGHTING AND WIRING EQUIPMENT-Caatiusd 
Lighting Equipment, Not Elsewhere Classiied 
Establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing lighting flxtnres and equip, 
ment, electric and nonelectric, not elsewhere dassifled, indnding flashlights a&d 
similar portable lamps, searchlights, ultra-violet lamp fixtures, and infra-red lamp 
fixtures. Establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing electric light bulbs, tub*, 
and related light sources are classifled in Industry 3641, and those producing glasswan 
for lighting fixtures are classified in Major Group 32. 
Arc lamps, except eJectrotherapeutlc 
Area and iporti luminaries 
Arlation. runway approach, taxi and 
ramp Ufhtlnf flxtnres 
Decorative area lighting fixtures, ex-
cept residential 
Flashlights 
Floodlights 
Fountain lighting flxtnres 
Gas lighting fixtures 
Lamp fixtures, infra-red 
Lanterns: electric gaa. carbide,.kero-
sene, and gasoline 
Miners' lamps 
Public lighting flxtnres 
Reflectors, for lighting equipment-
metal 
Searchlifbts 
8potlights, except automobile 
Stage lighting equipment 
8treet lighting fixtures, except trtfl-
sijrnals 
8wlmmlng pool lighting flxtnres 
Ultra-riolet limp flxtnres 
Underwater lighting fixtures 
RADIO AND TELEVISION RECEIVING EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT COMMUNICA. 
TION TYPES 
Radio and Television Receiring Sets, Exeept Communication Types 
Establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing electronic equipment for home 
entertainment, including auto radios and tape players. This industry also include* 
establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing public address systems and music 
distribution apparatus. Establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing phono-
graph records and pre-recorded tape are dassifled in Industry 3662. Establlshmetti 
primarily engaged in manufacturing separate cabinets for home electronic equipmant 
are classified in Major Group 25. 
Phonograph!, indnding eoin-operatri 
Pickup heads, phonograph 
Pillows, stereo 
Public address systems 
Radio and phonograph combinationi 
Radio receiring sets 
Recording machines, music and speech: 
except office and Industrial 
Sound reproducing equipment: except 
motion picture 
Speaker monitors 
8peaker systems 
Teleriaion receirlng sets 
Turntables, for phonographs 
Video triggers (remote control TT •> 
rices) 
Amplifiers: radio, public address, or 
muaical Instrument 
Audio electronic systems, except com-
munication 
Coin-operated phonographs 
FM and AM tuners 
Home recorders, cassette, cartridge 
and reel 
Juke boxes 
Loudspeakers, electrodynamlc and 
magnetic 
Microphones 
Muiic distribution apparatus, except 
records or tape 
Musical instrument amplifiers 
Phonograph and radio combinations 
Phonograph turntables 
S6S2 Phonograph Records and Pre-recorded Magnetic Tape 
Establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing phonograph records and pre-
recorded magnetic tape. Establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing electronic 
equipment for home entertainment, except records and pre-recorded magnetic tape, 
are classified in Industry 866L 
Magnetic tape, pre-recorded 
Master records or tapes, preparation of 
Phonograph record blanks 
Phonograph records (indnding prepa-
ration o€ the master) 
Prerecorded magnetic tape 
Record blanks, phonograph 
Recording studios 
Records, phonograph 
Tape, magnetic: pre-recorded 
SERVICES 315 
Major Group 78.—MOTION PICTURES 
The Major Group as a Whole 
This major group includes establishments producing and distributing motion pictures, exhibiting 
motion pictures in commercially operated theaters, and furnishing services to the motion picture 
industry The term "motion pictures19 includes similar productions for television or other media using 
film, tape or other means. 
Group Industry 
No. No. 
781 MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION AND ALLIED SERVICES 
7813 Motion Picture Production, Except for Television 
Establishments primarily engaged in the production of theatrical and nontheatrlcal 
motion pictures for exhibition, other than for television. Establishments engaged In 
both production and distribution are included here; those engaged in production of 
educational, industrial and religious films are also included. 
Audiovisual program production, ex- Motion picture production and dlstrl-
cept for TV notion, except for TV 
Cartoon motion picture production, ex- Nontheatrlcal motion picture produc-
cept for TV tlon, except for TV 
Educational motion picture production, Religious motion picture production. 
except for TV except for TV 
Industrial motion picture production. Training motion picture production. 
except for TV except for TV 
7814 Motion Picture and Tape Production for Television 
Establishments primarily engaged in the production of theatrical and nontheatrlcal 
motion pictures and tape, including commercials, for television exhibition. Establish-
ments engaged in both production and distribution are included here. Producers of live 
television shows (except tape shows) are classified In Industry 7929. 
Cartoon production, television Nontheatrlcal motion picture film and 
Commercials, television : tape or film tape production for television 
Educational motion picture production. Television film production 
television Video tape production (but not repro-
Motion picture production, television dudng) (Including distribution) 
7819 Services Allied to Motion Picture Production 
Establishments primarily engaged in performing services independent of motion pic-
ture production but allied thereto, such as motion picture film processing, editing and 
titling; casting bureaus; wardrobe and studio property rental; television tape services 
(editing, transfers, etc.); and stock footage film libraries. 
Casting bureaus, motion picture Rental of motion picture equipment 
Developing and printing of commercial Studio property rental for motion pic-
motion picture film tore film production 
Directors, motion picture: Independent Tiding of motion picture film 
Editing of motion picture film TV tape services : editing, transfer*. 
Film libraries, stock footage etc. 
Film processing, motion picture Wardrobe rental for motion picture 
Laboratories, motion picture (service) film production 
Motion picture consultants 
782 MOTION PICTURE DISTRIBUTION AND ALLIED SERVICES 
7823 Motion Picture Film Exchanges 
Establishments primarily engaged in renting theatrical and nontheatrlcal film to 
exhibitors, other than in the field of television. Establishments engaged in both distri-
bution and production are included in Industry 7813. 
Film exchanges, motion picture Rental of motion picture film, except 
Motion picture distribution,excluaive film for TV 
of production, except for TV 
